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Article 4701 of the Code of Civil Procedure was designed
to clarify the problem of notice in support of summary ejectment
proceedings. In Maxwell, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc.,78 the court
held that only a five-day period of notice is required in the case
of a lease having a definite term. This holding appears to be
entirely in accord with the intention of the draftsmen.

TORTS
Wex S. Malone*
The Louisiana appellate courts handed down several hundred
torts cases during the past term. Any attempt to select a manageable group of decisions for discussion can prove to be embarrassing as well as difficult for the reviewer. As I reread the
pages that follow I am struck by the unseemly critical tone of
many of my comments. But the reason for this is fairly obvious. The bulk of the cases, which are clear and sound, escape
discussion for the very reason that they are well decided and
present issues upon which the Louisiana law may be regarded
as fairly well settled. Spectators do not throw pop bottles at
the umpire until he calls a close one.
DUTY
The recently decided case, Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co.,' presents
a picture that is attracting increased attention throughout the
nation. Lee, the deceased, following a few social drinks, drove
at night to Sak's Lounge, defendant's insured, a bar located on
congested Highway 80 in Bossier City. The petition alleged
that the deceased was continuously coaxed to drink by Sak's
waitresses, who were employed for the purpose of encouraging
customers, until he had consumed "thirty-forty drinks," had
grown helpless, and had fallen a number of times to the knowledge of all present. The establishment was closed several hours
after midnight and deceased was required to leave the premises
by employees who were aware of the danger involved in his
exposure to the traffic of the four-lane transcontinental high78. 172 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). Writ refused.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 175 So. 2d 381 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
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way. He was killed almost immediately thereafter while out
in this road in his helplessly intoxicated condition. The petition
for damages for wrongful death was dismissed by the court of
appeal on an exception of no cause of action.
The sole basis of the defendant's exception was the contributory negligence of the deceased as shown on the face of the petition. Hence the court was restricted in its attack on the controversy. Strangely, there was no mention of the doctrine of
last clear chance in the opinion. It seems, however, to this
writer that the facts presented clearly a last chance situation
under accepted Louisiana law. Lee's negligence in becoming
intoxicated, although reprehensible, had nevertheless placed him
in a condition of obvious helplessness, and his imminent peril
was fully appreciated by the defendants, who thereafter had
the opportunity and facilities for preventing the tragedy. 2 Furthermore, the defendant's deliberate exclusion of the helpless
plaintiff, exposing him to the obvious risk of an injury or death
in traffic might well be regarded as willful and wanton misconduct, thus excluding the defense of contributory negligence.
If the defense of contributory negligence were obviated,
there still would remain the question as to what duty the proprietor owed with reference to the safety of his drunken patron.
If the usual American position were adopted, recovery could not
be based solely on the fact that the defendant was negligent in
selling whiskey to an obviously intoxicated person who might
foreseeably injure himself or others if he were encouraged to
consume more liquor. It is generally said that in such situations the wrongful sale of intoxicants is not the "proximate
cause" of any injury in traffic that flows from the continued
excessive drinking.3 Perhaps it is felt that the accident cost
is too high to be borne by the liquor traffic or that the varied
2. Rottinan v. Beverly, 183 La. 947, 165 So. 153 (1935). This same position
was restated and applied recently in Evans v. Thorpe, 175 So. 2d 418 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1965); Coleman v. Mason, 174 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
Although the last clear chance doctrine finds its most frequent application in
traffic situations, there is no sound reason why it should not be applied to
other accidents.
3. State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951). Comment, 20 LA.
L. REv. 800 (1960). Even tinder this view it is arguable that recovery should
be allowed in Lee's case. This was not merely an incident of "sale" to an intoxicated patron. The defendant employed bar girls whose job was to increase
Conceding
profits by urging customers to drink (even beyond their capacity).
that sound policy would be served by protecting the ordinary seller of liquor
of
traffic
risks
flowing
from
excessive
drinking,
it does
from the ruinous costs
not follow that the same kind of protection should shield those sellers who follow
the practices charged against Sak's Lounge.
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circumstances may prove to be too, difficult to administer in the
courtroom. Therefore, any change must come by way of legislation, and some states have enacted statutes conferring a civil
action against sellers of intoxicating liquor subject to various
4
restrictions.
The Lee case, however, differs substantially from the usual
situation where the seller of intoxicants is sued unsuccessfully
for injuries suffered by the drunken purchaser or by third
persons. Lee was "turned out" or "required to leave" the premises while he was disabled under circumstances where his
danger was imminent and obvious." If an ill patron were
ordered out of business premises under such circumstances that
it were obvious to the proprietor that his exclusion involved a
substantial risk of injury or death, recovery would be expected.
This much duty is owed even to a trespasser. Just as the defendant may not kill a trespasser to. eject him, he will not be
privileged to put him out when he will be exposed to the danger
of serious physical harm.6
Emotional Disturbance
The right to recover for the physical consequences of severe
emotional distress brought about by defendant's negligence has
been the subject of considerable discussion in Louisiana and
elsewhere for several decades. The situation on shock and fright
in this state has been ably discussed in this Review and need
not be further elaborated here.7 The most controversial area
today centers around the situation where one member of a family
witnesses or otherwise learns of the death or injury of another
family member and thereupon suffers shock so severe as to
cause death or physical injury. Under these circumstances, is
the negligent defendant who was responsible for the original
accident to be made liable also for the second injury? Almost
without exception, courts everywhere have given a negative
answer to this question. By and large the Louisiana courts have
adopted the majority position. The clearest and most recent
decision in LaPlace v. Minks. 8 In this case the plaintiff's child
was killed through the alleged negligent driving of the defendant.
4. Comment, 20 LA. L. REV. 800, 802 (1960).
5. Depue v. Plateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.WV. 1 (1907).
in PROSSER, TORTS 399, n.71 (3d ed. 1964).
6. PROSSER, TORTS 399, n.71, 117 (3d ed. 1964).
7. Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 473 (1963).
8.' :174 So. 2d 895 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).

See also cases cited
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Upon learning of the tragedy the plaintiff suffered a severe and
disabling heart attack for which he sought damages. Recovery
was denied in a clear and well-reasoned opinion. This decision
deserves careful comparison with the earlier case, Holland v.
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.," which has been noted in this
Review.10
A less dramatic but equally interesting decision dealing with
the physical consequences of emotional shock brought about by
negligence is Brouillette v. City Bldg. Supply Co." Plaintiff, an
elderly man, was proceeding down the public sidewalk and had
reached a point about opposite the center of an adjacent parking
lot. In the street the defendant's truck was preparing to turn
left so as to cross the sidewalk and enter the lot. The driver,
observing that plaintiff was obstructing his intended path, blew
his horn and screeched his brakes. This so frightened the aged
man that he fell while attempting to get out of the way and suffered the injuries complained of. Recovery was affirmed by
the court of appeal. It is well settled that one who drives so
negligently as to expose another person to an unreasonable risk
of being struck by the vehicle cannot escape liability even if
by chance impact is avoided but the fright occasioned by the
occurrence causes the victim to fall or otherwise injure himself
in his attempt to escape. Under these circumstances, the defendant, who has threatened the physical safety of the other,
cannot complain that the injury came about in an unexpected
manner.1 2 Perhaps the facts of the Brouillette case bring it
within the above observations. On the other hand, it appears
not unlikely that the defendant's driving did not place the
plaintiff in any actual danger of being struck. If this version
is correct, the defendant's only wrongdoing was his conduct in
exciting an obviously feeble and unstable person into a real but
unfounded fear that he was placed in danger. However, even
under these circumstances an imposition of liability is proper
whenever the defendant has reason to anticipate that the exin precipicitement he deliberately engenders is likely to result
1
mishap.'
other
or
fall
a
cause
tate action that could
9. 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
10. Note, 23 LA. L. REv. 473 (1963).

11. 174 So. 2d 658 (La.'App. 3d Cir. 1965).
12. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 436(2) (2d ed. 1965).
13. Id. §§ 312, 436(1).
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ADJOINING LANDOWNERS-

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN TORT

This writer has maintained on several occasions that a controversy does not lose its character as a torts dispute merely
because the plaintiff invokes article 667 of the Civil Code,14
which appears in the division of the Code devoted to servitudes25
A contrary opinion has been ably expressed by others, 16 and the
decisions themselves had left the answer in some doubt. The
implications of this dispute were suggested recently in a novel
context. Plaintiff's property was injured allegedly by vibrations resulting from pile-driving conducted by a contractor in a
public highway under direction of the state. The plaintiff,
in its attempt to meet the Highway Department's interposition
of the defense of sovereign immunity from tort liability, maintained that the claim was asserted under article 667 and hence
did not involve tort liability. The court of appeal rejected this
contention with the observation that a political body is neither
an "owner,"
as contemplated by the article, nor was it a
"neighbor. '1 7 The state's sovereign immunity thus remains,
but it is doubtful that either side of the property-versus-torts
dispute can gain much consolation from the decision. The court,
by excluding the claim from the provisions of article 667, avoided
committing itself on the nature of the liability imposed by that
article.
However, in another decision, Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp.,"8 the court of appeal did face head-on the
problem of the nature of article 667 liability. The problem
involved was one of prescription: Should a controversy based
upon this article be prescribed in one year, as other torts claims
are prescribed, or should it be governed by the ten-year period
of limitation that controls in suits brought upon contract? The
court, in characterizing the claim as one grounded in tort,
14. "Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still
be can riot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty
of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
15. Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947
Tern--Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 8 LA. L. REV. 248 (1948); Malone,
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term, 18 LA. L.
REV. 62 (1957). To the same effect, see Campbell, The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term, 16 LA. L. REV. 267 (1956).
16. Dainow, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947
Term-Property, 8 LA. L. REv. 234, 237 (1948).
17. Klein v. Louisiana Dep't Highways, 175 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965).
18. 170 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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observed that liability under article 667 is in effect a species
of "fault" liability as envisioned by article 2315 of the Civil
Code even though there may be no necessity to establish negligence, intent to injure, or "unlawful" conduct.
Decisions such as the above do little more than pave the way
for an answer to the more fundamental inquiry that must ultimately be faced by the Louisiana courts: Is article 667 to be
taken at its literal face value as an arbitrary pronouncement
that landowners are subject to unqualified liability for any
work done upon their land that happens to injure a "neighbor"?
Is there some fatal magic in land ownership that calls for a
radical shift in the spectrum of liability and ignores the normal
requirement that losses are to be shifted only upon the shoulders
of the blameworthy? Is it sufficient in reply to merely point
out that this is what the Code "says"?
When this inquiry is ultimately brought before the Supreme
Court for sharp and direct consideration, the following observations may be of some assistance: (1) article 667 does not represent any heritage from the French Civil Code; no counterpart of the provision is found in that document; (2) the adage
expressed in the article does have its direct counterpart in the
ancient common, law maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas
(one cannot use one's own so as to injure one's neighbor) ;19
(3) the common law maxim was abandoned more than a century
ago, and in its place there was substituted the doctrine of unqualified liability for damage done during the course of ultrahazardous activities (originally referred to as the rule of Rylands
v. Fletcher).20 This latter doctrine refers absolute liability, not
to land ownership, but to the act of engaging in specific activities which involve a foreseeably high risk of injury to
neighbors even when conducted with the utmost care (including
blasting, impounding large quantities of water, spraying chemicals from the air, and the like) .21 The benefit of the doctrine
19. See the discussion in PROSSER, TORTS § 74 (3d ed. 1964).
20. [1868] L.R. 3 W.L. 330.
21. Perhaps the most commonly accepted statement of the doctrine is in the
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1938) :
"§ 519. Miscarriage of Ultrahazardous Activities Carefully Carried On.
"Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity
is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as
likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm
resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although
the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm."
"§ 520. Definition of Ultrahazardous Activity."
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is thus available against all who engage in such an activity, and
this includes contractors. Thus the doctrine of ultra-hazardous
liability is a modern formula based upon sound notions of insurability and risk distribution. 22 This can hardly be said in
favor of a literal interpretation of article 667 of the Civil Code
whose barb is directed solely at the conduct of the landowner
on his own land, irrespective of the nature of the risk which
he created.
Although the Louisiana courts have paid lip service to a
literal acceptance of article 667 on several occasions, it is significant that in every instance where this has occurred there either
was involved an ultra-hazardous activity that would have called
for strict liability under the commonly accepted doctrine of
ultra-hazardous activities, or there existed a private nuisance
(which represents an area of liability all its own, and which
is by no means foreign to prevalent notions of fault) .23 Finally,
liability for the spread of fire has always been imposed by
Louisiana courts entirely in terms of negligence and fault, although fire-spread falls within the strict letter of article 667
in every respect.24 In other American jurisdictions liability for
fire is almost universally excluded from the doctrine of strict
liability resulting from ultra-hazardous activities.
The recent Gulf Ins. Co. decision, wihch explains article
667 as imposing a species of fault liability analogous to the
liability encompassed by article 2315, seems to this writer to
"An activity is ultrahazardous if it:
(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels
of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care,

and
"(b) is not a matter of common usage."
Discussions of the doctrine include: PROSSER,
HARPER & JAMES,

TOUTS

§§ 14.1-14.8

TORTS

§ 77 (3d ed. 1964); 2

(1956).

22. In America the doctrine is not restricted to activities that take place on
land. See 2 IARPER & JAMiES, TORTS § 14.5, at 805.
It will be noted from
the statement of the doctrine in the RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §1520(b)
(1938),

quoted in note 21 supra, that the activity must be one that is not in common
usage. Hence, injuries inflicted by the operation of automobiles and ordinary
industrial machinery, for example, are excluded, and negligence must be shown.
23. The only meaningful characteristic that distinguishes the "nuisance" from
other types of liabilky is that the nuisance involves an interference with use
and enjoyment of land, as opposed to a physical invasion of property, as in
trespass. It is not a "type" of liability, and it may rest either on negligence,
intention, or upon principles of ultra-hazardous activity. Prosser observes that
in nuisance cases "the court must make a comparative evaluation of the conflicting interests according to objective legal standards, and the gravity of the harm
to the plaintiff must be balanced against the utility of the defendant's conduct."
PROSSER, TORTS § 90, at 617 (3d ed. 1964).

24. Comment, Railroad Liability for Fires in Louiaiana, 15 LA. L. REv. 163
(1954).

1966]

PRIVATE LAW

point the way toward a rational approach to the true significance of article 667. The same considerations that go into
the familiar fault approach of article 2315 should appropriately
play a part also in controversies under article 667. One who
(as owner, contractor, or otherwise) engages in a hazardous
activity on land that involves a substantial risk of injury to
others even when the activity is conducted with all possible care
should properly be made to answer for the consequences. If,
with eyes open to the high possibility of damage involved, any
person seeks to reap the benefit of blasting, oil production and
similar activities, he should pay the cost of damage resulting
therefrom. Such conduct can appropriately be classified as
"fault," even though it is not to be condemned morally or
socially. 25 But it is important to notice that the emphasis should
rest upon the highly dangerous character of the land-developing
activity involved, and not upon the mere fact that the defendant
happened to be a landowner who was doing something in the
way of developing or utilizing his property. Similarly, the
benefits of absolute liability should extend to suits against contractors and all others who choose, for their own profit, to conduct an activity that involves a high degree of danger to those
within the foreseeable area of danger. An acceptance by our
courts of the hazardous-activity rationale, suggested above,
would involve no contradiction of the results reached in prior
Louisiana decisions.
ASSAULTS-AGGRESSOR DOCTRINE

Two recent decisions afford further evidence of the deterioration of the so-called "aggressor" doctrine that has plagued Louisiana law in past years. In the first of these cases, Baughman
v. Wells,26 the court ruled that the doctrine cannot be used to
justify an assault prompted by insulting remarks after the assaulting defendant has had a reasonable opportunity to "cool
off." The opinion indicates that the provoking words must
have been uttered immediately preceding the attack. The other
decision, Rivers v. Brown,27 affirmed and followed a position
25. An interesting development of this thesis will be found in Stone, Tort
Doctrine in Louisiana: The Materials for the Decision of a Case, 17 TUL. L.
Rv. 159, 207-15 (1942). Professor Stone's observations were influential in the
decision in the instant case, Gulf Ins. Co. 'v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 170
So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
26. 171 So. 2d 759 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
27. 168 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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announced in Louisiana earlier2 8 to the effect that the defendant

may lose the benefit of the aggressor doctrine if he uses "excessive force." The opinion observed that excessive force is
force "beyond what is reasonably required under the circumstances of the case."
The term "excessive force" has a peculiar ring when used
in association with the aggressor doctrine. The phrase can be
readily understood when it is employed in connection with
common defenses such as self-defense, defense of another, or
defense of property. In such cases the assaulting defendant is
privileged to use force as a means of attaining some socially
desirable end-the protection of person or property. The force
must be limited to such as appears reasonably necessary to
achieve the purpose for which the defense was given, and anything more is excessive and beyond the protection of the privilege.
The aggressor doctrine, on the other hand, is not geared to the
attainment of any recognizable social objective. It is a mere
recognition of hot temper aroused by provocation-a toleration
by government of the attitude of the frontiersman. When the
notion of excessive force is incorporated into this doctrine, the
result can be only to invite the court's personal estimate as to
how vigorously a defendant should be permitted to reply in
violence to a given insult. In a close case this must be difficult business for a conscientious judge, although it is obvious
that some such modifier must be available to the courts if the
aggressor doctrine is to be kept within manageable bounds.
This writer would be happy if the entire aggressor doctrine
were shelved in some museum of archaic legalisms. Gross insults and violations of privacy are now actionable torts everywhere, and the aggrieved person should seek his redress in the
courtroom rather than in gladiatorial combat.
DUTY AND CAUSE-IN-FACT

The recent decision, Lee v. Carwile,2-' points up the close intervolvement of duty and cause-in-fact. Plaintiff, a roomer in
defendant's boarding house, was injured when the house was
destroyed by fire during the night. The only alleged neglect
of the defendant was its failure to provide exterior fire escapes
of the type of construction required by statute. Specifically,
28. Landry v. Gilger Drilling Co., 92 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
29. 168 So. 2d 469 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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wood ladders only were provided, while the statute required the
installation of exterior stairs with railings and with a designated
Plaintiff was asleep in a rear bedroom on
angle of descent.3
the second floor. He could not reach the rear exit because of
the flames, and passage to the front exit was made so hazardous
by the presence of smoke that plaintiff did not attempt to approach it from down the hallway. Instead he leaped from his
own bedroom window and sustained the injuries for which he
sued. The decision, denying recovery, is couched chiefly in terms
of cause-in-fact. The court emphasized that even if defendant
had complied with the statute, the plaintiff would have been
unable to reach the front escape owing to the smoke hazard in
the hallway.
The opinion referred to the rule laid down by the Supreme
Court in Dotson v. Louisiana Cent. Lumber Co. 1 to the effect
that when it is shown that defendant violated some statutory
safety regulation the burden shifts to defendant to show that
the violation was not a proximate cause of the damage to plaintiff. - Even so, observed the court in the instant decision, the
evidence taken as a whole makes it clear that plaintiff could
not avail himself of the escapes provided.
This decision is called to the reader's attention, not because
it is believed to be erroneous nor even because the language
of cause-in-fact was entirely inappropriate, but in order to point
out the close affinity between inquiries of duty and those of
causation. It is important to bear in mind that the defendant
was not chargeable with a failure to provide a sufficient number
of exterior escapes, nor was it charged with neglecting to install
these at locations prescribed by law. This is abundantly clear
from the opinion. 32 The only contention of plaintiff was that
the exits were ladders, while the statute required stairways with
handrails and with a specified maximum angle of descent. It
follows that the only risks encompassed by the provision violated
were the risks of falling or sustaining other injury attributable
to a sharp descent or to the unavailability of arm support.
Plaintiff did not encounter any such risk, because he failed to
reach the exits for reasons not attributable to defendant. Plaintiff did attempt unsuccessfully to show that he would have
30. LA. R.S. 40:1585 (1950), as amended La. Acts 1952, No. 340, § 9.
31. 144 La. 78, 80 So. 205 (1918).
32. 168 So. 2d at 475.
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gone to the front and used the fire escape there if he had not
feared that its structure was unsafe. If this contention had
been supported by the evidence, he would probably have brought
his injury within the range of risks protected by the provision
that defendant violated. In such event a true cause-in-fact
problem would have been presented (i.e., if plaintiff had not
been so deterred from attempting escape, would he probably
have succeeded in reaching the ladder?). But as the matter
stands, the case presents a situation where the plaintiff did
not suffer damage arising from any risk within the contemplation of the statutory provision regulating the structural condition of fire exits-the only provision violated by the defendant.
The cause-in-fact approach adopted by the decision did lead the
court unerringly to the proper conclusion, and the opinion by
Tate, J., is truly an excellent one within the ambit chosen by the
court. But the writer of the opinion, having chosen a causation approach, felt obliged to engage in a lengthy discussion of
the burden of proof with reference to the issue of cause, when,
as I see it, there was no cause issue involved. A court's choice
of issue is frequently dictated by the pleadings on appeal, and
plaintiff's counsel in Lee v. Carwile had ingeniously posed the
problem in terms of causation, since this afforded the best line
of argument from the victim's standpoint.
DUTY OF OCCUPIER OF LAND

Duty of Occupiers to Business Guests
In a previous installment of this Symposium the writer
pointed to the difficulty encountered by courts in seeking to
determine when a customer injured on business premises should
be regarded as guilty of contributory negligence or as having
assumed the risk of accident."3 At that time it was suggested
that most of the difficulty stems from differences of opinion
among the judges concerning the extent of the duty owed by
the proprietor to his customers. If the full measure of the
proprietor's obligation is only to obviate those dangers that even
an alert customer could not discover for himself, then it is to
be expected that the alleged heedlessness of the customer will
always serve to bar his recovery. If, on the other hand, more
is demanded of the proprietor by law, and if he can be required
33. Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1961,
Term - Torts, 25 LA. L. REv. 334, 337 (1965).
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to anticipate that his customers will expect the place to be
reasonably safe and that they will correspondingly relax the
precautions taken for their own protection, then the proprietor
must take into account a certain amount of expectable heedlessness of customers if he is to meet the standard of care required
of him. Whenever the duty of the proprietor is so viewed the
inadvertence of the customer will frequently be minimized or
4
disregarded.3
This difference in the basic approaches to the proprietor's
duty is brought out with unusual clarity in a comparison of the
dissenting opinions of Judges Tate and Culpepper, on the one
hand, and of Judge Hood, on the other, in the recent decision
Miller v. New Amsterdam Cas.35 Plaintiff, a customer of the
House of Fashion, a beauty shop operated by the defendant,
slipped and fell in a most unfashionable manner upon ice that
covered the private walkway leading to the premises. The
majority opinion faced the problem as one relevant to the proprietor's duty. The opinion stated that a, proprietor owes no
duty to remedy conditions which were observed by the customer
or which could have been observed by her if she had been
reasonably alert. In view of the fact that Mrs. Miller saw the
ice and encountered it, the defendant (who also knew of the
condition (owed her no duty to correct it, irrespective of how
easily or how inexpensively this might have been done. Since
the defendant breached no legal duty owed plaintiff, the issue
of contributory negligence was pretermitted and no decision on
that matter was necessary.
The dissenting opinions expressed disagreement with the
majority as to the extent of the duty owed the patron. They
emphasized that defendant, by maintaining the doors of its
establishment open, thereby invited the public to encounter the
dangerous icy condition. By so doing, the proprietor came under
a duty to use reasonable care to make the premises safe. In
dealing with the remaining issue of contributory negligence or
assumption of risk, the dissenting opinions observed that although plaintiff knew the walkway was slippery, she "certainly
she would
did not think that if she attempted to walk across ' it
6
suffer serious and permanently disabling injuries. 3
34. Ibid.
35. 164 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
36. Id. at 685.
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The difference in the approaches of the majority and the
dissenting opinions is interesting. Since the majority opinion
limited the duty of the proprietor to the removal of hidden
defects that could not be reasonably discovered by the patron,
the writer found it unnecessary to discuss the possible contributory negligence or assumed risk of the patron. But the dissenting opinions, after acknowledging a broader duty, were still
obliged to dispose of the alleged assumption of risk on the part
of the victim. Quite obviously this leads to an anomalous
predicament, for once it is acknowledged that the proprietor is
under a duty to anticipate that a patron may knowingly encounter the danger and that he has a corresponding duty to
remove even obvious perils, it is difficult to claim that the very
knowledge of the patron which the proprietor was obliged to
guard against operates to deprive the victim of recovery on the
ground that he has assumed the risk or is guilty of contributory
negligence.
The anomaly described above continues to give trouble everywhere, for the law is definitely in a state of transition with
respect to the proprietor-customer relationship. The original
draft of the Restatement of Torts adopted the same position as
the majority opinion in the instant case-there is no duty to
repair obviously dangerous conditions.17 Thirty years later,
however, the course of decision forced a change of position by
the American Law Institute. A new section was added to the
Restatement of Torts Second, which provides:
"Sec. 343A. A possessor of land is not liable to his
invitees [business guests] for physical harms caused by
any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known
or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate
the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness." (Emphasis added.)
It was pointed out earlier 35 that in most of the litigated
crses where the courts or juries have found that the patron
was contributorily negligent or that he assumed the risk, it will
be found that there was in actuality no appreciable fault on the
part of the proprietor and the claim could have been readily
dismissed on that ground alone. Another and more recent ex37. RESTATE.ENT,

TORTS, § 343(C)

(1931).

38. Malone, The WVork of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964
Term- Torts, 25 LA. L. REV. 334, 337 (1965).
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ample of this type of decision is afforded in Colclough v. Orleans Parish Schools- 9 The facts in that case indicated that
during the course of football practice on the field of a high
school the team was engaged in scrimmage while the plaintiff and several others were spectators and congregated around
an area that was about ten to twelve feet from what would
be one of the side boundary lines of the field. During the
course of scrimmage one of the players ran into the plaintiff
and injured him. It seems obvious to the writer that this was
not a public game and it could not be expected that special
precautions would be taken for the twenty-five or so spectators
who watched the proceeding. The decision, then, is clearly correct in its result. There was no negligence. The court's conclusion, however, was justified entirely in terms of the contributory
negligence or assumed risk of the patron. It is doubtful that a
court would resort to this rationale if the injury had taken place
during a game to which the public was invited as paying spectators and if actionable negligence with reference to the provision
of spectator accommodations or safeguards were properly chargeable to the defendant.
Duty of Proprietorof Business Premises to Control
Conduct of Patronsor Third Parties
The proprietor of a business establishment owes to his
patrons a duty of care, not only with respect to the physical
condition of his premises, but likewise to protect them against
the expectable misconduct of other patrons or of third persons
whom he has permitted to be on the premises. 40 This duty is
a concomitant of the proprietor's power to deny admission to
those persons whose expectable misconduct would constitute a
threat to the safety of other patrons or invitees and of his power
to eject any patron whose conduct has become obviously dangerous since his admission to the premises. Particularly is this
duty clear where the proprietor has so arranged his premises
as to increase the risk that one patron's carelessness or misconduct may injure another, or where the propietor tolerates dangerous objects on the premises which could be readily utilized by
a thoughtless or mischievous patron so as to inflict injury. 41 Thus
39. 166 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
40. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 344 (2d ed. 1965); PROSSER, TORTS 315, 402
(3d ed. 1964).
41. PRoSSER, TORTS 315, 402 (3d ed. 1964). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS
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the operator of a barroom who allowed his inebriated patrons
access to a pistol loaded with blank cartridges was held liable
for an injury that resulted from a prank played by one customer
upon another through the use of this weapon.4 2 Similarly, in
another case the court suggested that a hotel whose employees
passively stood by while one drunken guest assaulted another
could be subjected to liability for the resulting damage. 43 On
the other hand, the proprietor of a bowling alley escaped liability for an injury suffered by one patron when another patron
inadvertently struck her in the abdomen while practicing a
backswing with a bowlingball.4 4 The alleged negligence of the
proprietor was the defective arrangement of the premises so
that the refreshment bar (where the plaintiff was seated) was
in close proximity to the rack in which bowling balls were
stored. The spare facts set forth in the opinion suggest that
there was no serious defect in the layout of the alley and its
facilities; hence the court's denial of liability could probably
be justified on the facts. The opinion, however, contains disturbing language to the effect that "a proprietor cannot anticipate the negligence of his patrons. He furthermore cannot
be held for the negligence of another without some special
'4 5
relationship.
Duty-Attractive Nuisance
The so-called "attractive nuisance" doctrine at one time
played an important role as a device to assist courts in ridding
the law of the ancient no-duty-toward-trespassers restriction in
situations involving trespassing children. However, in recent
years it has largely outworn its usefulness and can prove to be
an actual handicap to the effective administration of justice.
Through the use of attractive nuisance language during the
first decade of this century it became possible to announce that
a limited duty of care is owed to young child trespassers with
respect to dangers on land that could be obviated without
serious inconvenience or heavy cost to the owner. Now that
the duty has become recognized and it is acknowledged that
§ 343 (2d ed. 1965) which should be considered in connection with §§ 302A,
302B.
42. Cavalier v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 170 So. 2d 713 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1964).
43. Cf. Stewart v. Roosevelt Hotel, .190 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).

44. Alfortish v. Masstichnsetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 705 (La. App.
4th *Cir. 1965).
45. Id. at 707.
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a landowner can be regarded as negligent under such circumstances, the desirability of retaining a special "nuisance" doctrine is highly doubtful. *6 But attractive nuisance language
persisted in the decisions. As a result the opinions became
replete with increasingly elaborate discussions as to whether
this or that defect qualifies as an "attractive nuisance. ' 4 In
the overwhelming majority of the cases in which courts explained that the object inflicting the harm was not an "attractive
nuisance," recovery could have been denied simply and effectively
through the observation that there was no adequate showing
of negligence on the part of the landowner. The continued
emphasis upon attractive nuisance is more than a matter of
confusing terminology. Its persistence in opinions conveys the
impression that "attractive nuisance" is to be regarded as a
unique type of liability, and that whenever the offending dangerous object meets the nuisance qualification liability must
follow as a matter of course without reference to the presence
or absence of negligence on the part of the landowner. The
recent Louisiana decision, Mairtin v. Sessum Serv. Corp. 48 is an
example. The facts appear to be very simple: a five year old
child crawled into a residence that was still under construction
by defendant and fell from a window. The writer gathers
from the sparse statement of facts that the accident happened
after working hours and at a time when no adult was present.
There was no suggestion as to what defendant should have done
to minimize a danger of this kind. Unless the standard of
reasonable care for landowners is to be regarded as imposing
a duty on builders to maintain a watchman or to fence off all
construction work in residential neighborhoods, it is difficult
to find any suggestion of negligence upon which the plaintiff's
claim could be predicated. Thus the court's ultimate conclusion
that there was no liability appears entirely appropriate. But
46. l'erhaps the most widely approved section of the RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(19.38) is § 334, which deals with the duty of an occupier of land toward trespassing children. The term "attractive nuisance" is not used. Instead, liability
is imposed through reference to four factors or considerations listed in the section.
Among many recent decisions repudiating the language of attractive nuisance
are Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955) ; King v.
Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98, 1 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1959).
Writers almost
universally espouse the Restatement approach : Prosser, Ports § 59 (3d ed. 1964)
2 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 275, at 1450 (1956).
47. Convincing evidence of the useless complexities attendant upon the effort
to classify objects on land as being, or not being, "attractive nuisances" is afforded by a casual examination of 1 A.L.R. Word Index to Annotations 179-82
(1937) in which four double-columned pages are devoted to a bare listing of
such objects as they are treated in this single set of books.

48. 174 So. 2d 180 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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the opinion does not contain a single reference to the presence
or absence of negligence. It is devoted entirely to the abstract
question as to whether a residence under construction is to be
Indeed, the opinion
regarded as an "attractive nuisance."
observed, "the attractive nuisance doctrine is in derogation of
the ordinary rules of negligence and, therefore, should be applied with great caution." 49 As the writer understands the
matter, the opposite is true. The doctrine merely serves to
bring into operation the ordinary principles of reasonable care
in one type of trespasser situation where, apart from the doctrine, there would be no recognized duty of care toward children
who are on the land of another without permission. In any
view the existence or non-existence of negligence must remain
the principal issue.
DUTY

OF AGENT TO THIRD PARTIES

The tort liability of an agent for failure (or omission) to
perform duties required by his contract with his principal
resulting in injury to a third party is apparently not as clearly
settled in Louisiana as it appeared to be a few years ago. Prior
to 1958 the jurisprudence, was made up largely of inconclusive
observations that stemmed largely from an 1882 decision,
Delaney v. Rochereau.50 In the Delaney case the Supreme Court
restricted the tort liability of an agent to misfeasance and
malfeasance, and denied liability for negligent nonfeasance.
This decision and similar announcements by courts elsewhere
have been severely criticized by writers. 51 Later decisions either
abandoned the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance,
or they expanded the term, misfeasance, so as to embrace negligent omissions as well as acts of affirmative misconduct. The
Restatement of Agency Second imposes on the agent a duty of
care toward third persons whenever his failure to act without
negligence would serve to deprive the third person of some
protection owed the latter by the principal. 52 In 1958 this
position was clearly adopted*in a well-reasoned opinion by the
Louisiana Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Adams v.
49. Id. at 182.
50. 34 La. Ann. 1123, 44 Am. Rep. 456 (1882).
51. The most persuasive and devastating is Seavey, Liability of an Agent in
Tort, which first appeared in 1916 in 1 So. L.Q. 16 (1916), republished in SEAVEY,
STUDIES IN AGENCY 1 (1949).
52. RESTAIEMENT, AGENCY § 354 (2d ed. 1958). See particularly comment a.
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Fidelity & Cas. Co.53 The Supreme Court refused a writ of cer54
tiorari in Adams' case.
In considering the Adams decision it should be borne in
mind that the agent should not be held responsibile to a third
person for his mere failure to perform an affirmative duty
toward his principal unless (a) the principal owed a duty of
care toward the third person, and (b) this same duty was
delegated to the agent, who undertook its performance. When
both these conditions have been met it will be found that the
agent, by failing to perform his duty, has deprived the third
person of the protection to which the latter was entitled and
which, presumably, he would have received from the principal
if the agent had not undertaken its performance. Under these
circumstances the failure of the agent serves as a positive interference with the third person's right to reasonable protection
by the principal, and his negligence becomes something more
than nonfeasance.
But the converse is also true. When the principal is not
encumbered with any duty toward the third person or, even if
he is so encumbered, he has not delegated its performance to
the agent, there is no reason why mere nonfeasance by the
agent should result in his liability.15 This reasoning led the
Supreme Court in Day v. National U. S. Radiator Corp.56 to
deny recovery against an architect for the death of a worker
hired by a subcontractor, who was killed through the negligence
of the latter in the operative details of installing a boiler in a
building under construction. The principal (owner) owed no
duty to supervise the methods of operation adopted by the subcontractor, and even had he owed such a duty, the architect
was not hired for the purpose of protecting the safety of
workers.
A similar situation was recently presented to the Court of
Appeal for the Fourth Circuit in Daigle v. Cobb.57 The United
States entered into a contract for various support services with
Mason-Rust. Included was the provision of a chemical disposal
well. This work was subcontracted to Dow Industrial Service
who, in turn, subcontracted all or part of it to Anson Incorpora53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

107 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
Ibid.
See note 52 supra. Comment, 21 LA. L. REv. 849 (1961).
241 La. 288, 128 So. 2d 660 (1961).
175 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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ted, plaintiff's employer. The plaintiff was injured in the
course of his employment when four hundred pounds of pipe
became disconnected from the rig and fell upon him. The injury
was apparently due to carelessness of the plaintiff's own fellow
workers or to a failure by his own employer (the subcontractor)
to provide a safety chain. Plaintiff, being barred from recovery
for negligence against any of the contractors involved, due to
the exclusive remedy feature of the workmen's compensation
statute,5 s instituted suit against Cobb, the general manager of
Mason-Rust, the principal contractor. The facts suggest that
Cobb's duties may have been merely to coordinate the work
of the subcontractors and to insure that specifications in the
contract with the government were followed. If so, the action
of the court in dismissing the claim on a motion for summary
judgment was clearly correct. The case appears to be analogous
to Day's case in that Cobb's employer (the principal contractor)
was under no duty to supervise the methods of operation of its
subcontractors or to protect the latters' employees.
The court, however, chose to base its conclusion on the broad
proposition that an agent cannot be made liable to a third person
for mere nonfeasance of the agent in performing his duty to
his principal. 9 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
Orleans court by so doing placed itself in opposition to the
First Circuit with respect to the tort liability of an agent toward
third persons and that it has espoused a proposition rejected
in most of the later American decisions.
TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORTATION

The liability of a municipality for damages sustained in traffic by reason of a defective traffic signal was discussed in the
recent decision, Vidrine v. General Fire & Cas. Co.60 The City
of Ville Platte maintained a traffic signal at the intersection of
LaSalle Street and Latour Street. That side of the light facing
LaSalle Street was not in operating condition. The light, how58. LA. U.S. 23:1032 (1950).
59. Daigle v. Cobb, 175 So. 392, 395 (la. App. 4th Cir. 1965). The concurring
opinion of Barnette, J., id. at 397, particularly emphasizes that in the writer's
opinion nothing short of "positive wrong" could subject an agent to liability
to a third person. He distinguishes the Adams case, 107 So.. 2d 496 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1.958) on the ground that the agent had gained knowledge of the danger
and thereafter failed to remove it. This, Barnette, J., observes, is "very close
to an act of positive wrong."
60. 168 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
See also the companion case,
Ardoin v. General Fire & Cas. Co., 168 So. 2d 455 (La. App, 3d Cir. 1964).
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ever, was functioning as to the signal facing Latour Street. Mrs.
Vidrine was proceeding down LaSalle Street and, finding the
signals inoperative, assumed that they had been intentionally
extinguished by the city for the time. She therefore concluded
that LaSalle Street, in the absence of a signal, was entitled to
the right of way, and she proceeded slowly across the intersection, without stopping. At the same time Mrs. Ardoin, approaching the intersection on Latour Street, saw the light as
green and assumed that she could proceed into the intersection
without stopping. The result was a collision. Suit was brought
by both Mrs. Ardoin and Mrs. Vidrine against the liability
insurer of the City of Ville Platte. Any question of municipal
immunity was foreclosed by reason of the fact that the city had
insured against liability, and its insurer is not allowed to assert
governmental immunity of its insured as a defense. The court
concluded that the light had been inoperative for several days
and that the condition was due to the negligence of the city.
The defendant argued that in Mrs. Ardoin's suit it could not be
subjected to liability because the negligence of the city was
passive and the later conduct of Mrs. Vidrine intervened and
precluded liability on the part of the municipality. In answer
to this the court first held that Mrs. Vidrine was guilty of contributory negligence which would bar her own recovery. It
relied upon the recent Supreme Court decision, Soprano v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.61 In that case the Supreme Court
had observed "a nonfunctioning four sided semaphore signal
device at an intersection in plain view of an ordinary observant
motorist imposes a duty of extreme caution on any motorist approaching or entering that intersection. To enter such an intersection without slowing down or stopping to ascertain whether
the crossing can be negotiated in safety is imprudent and constitutes negligence in legal contemplation. ' "62- The court in the
instant case, however, refused to hold that Mrs. Vidrine's conduct in any way affected the liability of the city with respect
to Mrs. Ardoin, in whose favor the light was operating and
served as an invitation to proceed. The opinion properly relied
upon the decision in Dixie U-Drive-It Yourself System v. Americain Beverage Co.( ' In this latter decision, which has been much
discussed in Louisiana, 4 the court held that certain duties im61.
62.
63.
64.

246 La. 524, 165 So. 2d 308 (1964).
Id. at 534, 165 So. 2d at 312.
242 La. 471, -137 So. 2d 298 (1962).
Note, 23 LA. L. REV. 142 (1962).
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posed upon defendants should be construed as embracing the
risk that some other person might, at a later time, fail to
adjust himself reasonably in the face of the peril created in
violation of the duty. That doctrine properly applies here. The
duty of the city to use reasonable care to maintain its traffic
signals in operating condition contemplates the risk that some
highway user, faced with the emergency created by the absence
cf lights, would fail to adjust properly to the situation. It is
interesting to note that in most jurisdictions persons so situated
as Mrs. Vidrine have been allowed recovery for accidents attributable to inoperative traffic signals.65 It is particularly
noteworthy that if the possibility of Mrs. Vidrine's incautious
adjustment to the inoperative light is a risk to be borne by the
city in a suit by Mrs. Ardoin, it can be effectively argued that
the same should be true with reference to, Mrs. Vidrine's claim.
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BETWEEN JOINT TORTFEASORS

Effect of Settlement With One Wrongdoer
In Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co.,6 6 the court of appeal was
called upon for the first time to determine the effect to be
given a release executed in favor of one of two solidary tortfeasors upon the contribution right of the remaining tortfeasor.
Plaintiff, a passenger in a car driven by one defendant, was
injured when the car collided with a truck. The accident
allegedly was attributable to the negligence of both the host
driver and the operator of the truck. After institution of suit
against the insurers of both drivers the plaintiff entered into a
compromise agreement with the insurer of the host and released
it, reserving all rights to proceed against the insurer of the
other driver. Thereupon the host driver's insurer, upon motion,
was dismissed from suit over the protest of the insurer of the
truck driver. The latter claimed that he was entitled to insist
that the settling defendant be retained in order that the truck
driver's insurer be accorded his right to a judgment over for
contribution of half the amount ultimately found to be due. The
court of appeal affirmed the dismissal. It announced that
the effect of the joint tortfeasor's contribution measure 67 was
to place joint tortfeasors on precisely the same basis as other
65. See cases collected in Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 242, 275 (1960).
66. 163 So. 2d 915 (l.a. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
67. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870), as amended, La. Acts. 1960, No. 30, § 1.
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solidary obligors. Under this view, said the court, the effect
of the release of the host's insurer was to deprive the insurer
of the truck driver of the right to contribution to which he was
originally entitled. By so denying the remaining solidary
obligor of his normal claim for contribution, the victim (creditor) surrendered his right to recover anything above one-half
of the total amount of the claim from the remaining obligor.
Since this defendant thus gains in effect the benefit of contribution, he has no interest in the retention of the other defendant
in this suit. Presumably no credit is allowed for the payment
made in settlement.
The result described above seems to contemplate that the
tort victim may be either overcompensated (as where the amount
paid in settlement exceeds more than one-half of the sum
ultimately found to be due) or he may be undercompensated
(where the amount paid in settlement is less than one-half of
the amount ultimately found to be due). It is also to be noted
that the result above contemplates that the settlor who pays
more than one-half of what will ultimately be shown to be due
has no right to contribution against his former solidary obligor
for any part of the excess. This may have the effect of discouraging a payment of any sum in settlement that represents a
sizeable proportion of what the defendant anticipates he could
be obliged to pay through litigation. Furthermore, in controversies involving more than one alleged wrongdoer, it is
common practice to attempt settlement first with the party
against whom there is the least likelihood that a recovery could
be had. This tactic will be discouraged under the rule of the
Harvey case, for the plaintiff, by accepting a minimal settlement with the doubtful party, will find that he has reduced by
a full one-half the amount recoverable under his claim against
the more likely loser.
In a later decision, Stewart v. Roosevelt Hotel,6 the court
of appeal held that the rule of the Harvey case, is not applicable
where one tort defendant claims a right to indemnity against
another defendant. Plaintiff, a patron of the Roosevelt Hotel,
was, allegedly, assaulted and kicked by another patron who was
intoxicated at the time. The alleged fault of the hotel was in
failing to take any affirmative action to protect the plaintiff
against the assault after the hotel was reasonably chargeable
68. 170 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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with knowledge of the prospect of such an occurrence. Thereafter the victim executed a release of the guilty patron and his
insurer. In his suit against the hotel the latter sought to bring
in.the patron and his insurer as parties so that in the event the
Roosevelt Hotel were subjected to liability it could claim indemnity against the patron and his insurer. The court held
that third party practice was available to bring in the patron
and his insurer for purposes of indemnity. The hotel, chargeable only with "constructive" fault, should not be deprived of
its right to cast the ultimate burden in full upon the active
wrongdoer. In view of the fact that the right to contribution
and the right to indemnity are both devices to prevent unjust
enrichment, the disparity in treatment of the two with respect
to a settlement by one defendant is difficult to appreciate.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE-CONTRIBUTION

BETWEEN JOINT

TORTFEASORS

In 1963 there occurred a collision on the SummerfieldJohnson City Highway that gave rise to two companion suits: 9
involving serious and interesting questions on both negligence
law and the recent Louisiana contribution statute.7 0 Evans,
who was driving with his mother and two nieces as passengers,
undertook to make a left turn without proper attention to the
risk of being struck by the defendant Thorpe's car which was
approaching from the rear. Evans was thus clearly chargeable
with negligence. The court, however, found that Thorpe's attempt to overtake Evans under the circumstances was also
negligent. In Evans' suit to recover for his own personal injuries and for damage to his car the court allowed recovery on
the ground that Thorpe had the last clear chance. The opinion
contains an excellent concise statement of the last clear chance
doctrine and observes that Evans' effort to make a turn to the
left brought him into a position where he was within the opposite lane of traffic unaware of his exposure to danger from
Thorpe's overtaking vehicle. At the time Evans was no exposed, Thorpe did see the situation and should have realized
Evans' plight at a time when he could have changed his own
71
course so as to avoid the collision.
69. Evans v. Thorpe, 175 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965); Evans v.
Phoenix Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
70. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2103 (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.
71. Another

recent

last chance

decision

reaching

the same

conclusion

similar facts is Southall v. Graves, 165 So. 2d 57 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).

on
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Although resort to the last clear chance doctrine enabled
Evans to recover for his own injuries despite his contributory
negligence, this did not relieve him of liability for the injuries
suffered by his three passengers, who were without fault. The
fact that Thorpe had the last chance did not prevent Evans'
conduct from being a contributing cause of the injuries to his
mother and his two nieces. For this reason, Evans and his
liability insurer were cast as solidary obligors with respect to
the passenger injuries. Thus we are led to the strange conclusion that Evans' carelessness, which was a cause both of his
own injuries and of those of his passengers, did not operate to
deprive him of recovery for his own loss, although the same
misconduct rendered him liable for the harms suffered by the
family.
Since Evans and Thorpe were solidarily liable for the passenger injuries, the judgment provided that either defendant
who satisfied the claim was entitled to contribution from the
other under Louisiana Civil Code article 2103 and articles 11111116, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. The net result is that
Thorpe and his insurer must pay the entire cost of Evans' injuries, but they are encumbered with only half of the cost of the
injuries suffered by the passengers, although all the damage
accrued from precisely the same misconduct by each driver.
This conclusion is the unavoidable consequence of the state of
Louisiana law that recognizes contribution between joint tortfeasors but at the same time retains the doctrine of contributory negligence and its companion doctrine of last clear chance.
An equally anomalous result would have followed if the court
had concluded that Thorpe did not have the last clear chance.
In this event Evans would have been obliged to shoulder the
entire cost of his own injuries (since there would be no recovery against Thorpe), but he could oblige Thorpe to pay half
the cost of the injuries to the passengers by demanding contribution.
The basic difficulty leading to this complicated picture arises
from the absence in Louisiana of a comparative negligence
statute that could operate in harness with the contribution
measure. Both comparative negligence and contribution are
but separate facets of the single principle that losses should be
divided between wrongdoers whose faults contribute to a single
injury. Contribution comes into play when the consequence of
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joint wrongdoing is an injury to a third person, while comparative negligence applies where the consequence of the joint
wrongdoing is an injury to one of the wrongdoers himself. Had
Louisiana. enjoyed the benefit of a comparative negligence
statute,72 as well as a contribution measure, Evans would have
recovered for only half of his own loss (since last clear chance
doctrines should have no place where a scheme of comparative
negligence prevails) 73 just as he was similarly obliged to pay
only half the loss suffered by the blameless passengers (the
present rule under the contribution statute).

SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
SURETYSHIP

The contract of suretyship must be made in writing in order
to have any existence even as between the parties.' However,
instead of a secondary liability in the event of the debtor's default, another person may undertake a primary responsibility
for the indebtedness, and this relationship can be established
without any writing.
In Star Sales Co. v. Arnoult,2 the defendant had undertaken responsibility for credit sales to Colonial Distributors.
From its analysis of the facts, the court concluded that the running account on a credit basis was in essence with Colonial Distributors and that the defendant's position was intended by the
parties to be one of secondary liability in the nature of a surety.
Since there was no writing, there was no suretyship; and the
case was dismissed. Actually, the plaintiff had expressly refused
to open a credit account for Colonial Distributors and only
agreed to open such an account in the name of the defendant.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff knew that the purchases were being
made for Colonial Distributors, and therefore the court treated
the situation as if credit had been extended to Colonial Distribu72. See the discussion in Malone, Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125 (1945) ; INS. L.J. 217 (1946).
73. See the discussion in PROSSER, TORTS § 66, at 449 (3d ed. 1954).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2278 (1870).
2. 169 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).

